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Post-Lecture Discussion
SPEAKER: JORGE CORREA
MODERATOR: SCOTT P. MAINWARING
SPEECH: "DEALING WITH PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:
THE CHILEAN CASE AFTER DICTATORSHIP"
DATE: FEBRVARY 22, 1992
Professor Mainwaring: [Professor, Department of Government, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame.]
We have fifteen or twenty minutes for questions. Does anyone
have a question, please, or a comment?
Participant: I think we are all very grateful for your very eloquent
talk and for explaining to us the work of the Chilean Commission
on Reconciliation.
In the general public, there is a certain amount of cynicism
in that it tends to remind people of the Nuremberg Tribunal after
World War II which investigated war crimes. But it only investi-
gated the war crimes that were committed by the defeated against
the victors. It did not look into the whole question of crimes com-
mitted in the war, especially by guerilla forces, that were commit-
ted by the victors against the side that was defeated.
Now, my question is, is there a parallel here in that you have
the victors who are looking at crimes of human rights committed
against the victors by those who are out of power? Is that not just
a part of the truth? And if only a part of the truth is presented, is
not reconciliation made difficult? Or is it that there is terrorism,
for example, say, on the left, on the part of the guerrillas, to
murder minor officials which leads to terrorism on the part of the
right, the military, and that leads to more terrorism on the part of
the left who feel justified because of those excesses, and more
terrorism, and so on?
I hope I've made my question clear. Is this an example of
only partial truth, and can there be reconciliation with only partial
truth?
Professor Correa: I was trying to make the point that the Commis-
sion not only focused on the human rights violations committed
by the authoritarian regime, but it also focused on the political
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crimes that were committed by the left against policemen in the
streets, who were killed just because they were near policemen.
But, of course, very important distinctions have to be drawn
between one and the other. It's a very difficult issue. There's a big
discussion among scholars of human rights about whether you can
call that a human rights violation. Situations like Peru are widely
discussed, and you can call what happened there human rights
violations.'
But, classically, the scholars have been limiting the word hu-
man rights violation to those acts committed by the state. Of
course, there's a big difference when the one who is supposed to
be guarding public order, with all the resources, commits these
crimes.
In the Chilean situation, it must also be acknowledged that
those crimes committed by the left happened after the 1978 am-
nesty. So, both cases were investigated by the courts. But in one
type of case where the army was the violator of human rights, the
courts didn't have the help of the police to get to the truth in
those cases.
So, it was already known that the people from the left were
tried in most cases. While people on the right were generally not
tried in the courts. But the Commission tries to focus on both
issues. The President decided to do that.
And I think, to a large extent-not wanting to second guess
him-but I personally think, to a large extent, that he needed a
report that would be viewed as something that would be authori-
tative as the truth. It was very important for us.
For example, the first thing we did was to ask the armed
forces for their own casualties. And they complied with that. After
they had complied with our first request, we made a sec-
ond-please tell us who killed whom, or what happened to this
person.
So, it was very important for us to first ask who are your peo-
ple. But,' of course, the numbers are very different. It's about two
hundred thousand against eighty cases.
Professor Fisher: [Roger Fisher, Williston Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School.]
In your arguments against criminal punishment-with which I
strongly agree-you suggest that's perhaps the best way to express
moral values, I believe, and experience suggests, that's a very bad
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way to express moral values because the ambiguity in carrying out
orders is likely to be a very blurred message.
And if you focus on the punishment of officials engaged in
this conduct,, for example, Lieutenant Calley in Vietnam, gunning
down women and children in a trench. You know, the whole army
is under orders. Excessive duty went too far, of course, and did
too much.
But to me the biggest argument-a big argument against
trying to punish- past official violators-is that when you go after
them, there is such reluctance in the community to punish people
who are, quote, "doing their duty," and who may have been exces-
sive and may have gone too far.
The result is you don't punish them enough, you punish very
few, they get pardoned, they get excused, they get suspended
sentences. So, condemnation is much less effective than a report
that says the truth and lets people focus on it.
In this country we have a crime. It's a crime to break and
enter-for the police to break and enter to seize evidence. We
have had thousands of cases where evidence has been excluded
from a trial because it's obtained in violation of our Constitution.
As far as I know, there is only one such case in which the person
who authorized the break in ever went to jail.
And so, it is practically very difficult to get a society to punish
those who break the law. The moral message that comes from at-
tempting to do that is likely to be less effective in court. At least,
that's my opinion-I just believe you cannot-it's not just in Chile
that there are political reasons against doing it. It's a
well-organized society. We have great difficulty in punishing our
military who exceed authority, punishing those police who exceed
authority. Just trying to punish them ends up undercutting the
very values we are seeking to establish.
Professor Correa: I was making the point of the ideal restrictions
more than the desired goals between truth and punishment. But
I'm sure somebody else would like to discuss that issue. I would
like to comment on that. It is highly contested and will probably
produce some discussion.
Participant: On the one hand you could agree with Roger and say
you cannot do it; it does not work. But on the other hand, you
must. And it's exactly that tension in thfe reconciliation of a soci-
ety that is at issue.
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That is, that for the lack of the ability to re-instill values
about accountability, you have on the other side the possibility of
a whole series of victims and those who reference off the victims
losing confidence in one, the State's ability to live according to
the rule of law, and losing accountability and faith in institutions
that investigate the law.
Which makes, I think, the focus on the judiciary in Chile a
very interesting approach. In some respects one would say this is
the kind of kicking of the dog. Well, the judiciary had the respon-
sibility; it didn't have direct control. It had participation, but it
didn't give the direct orders.
And the approach to the judiciary in Chile is very different
than what is happening in Argentina in that regard.
It's that kind of tension between what we cannot do and what
we must do for the other section of society that makes this a spe-
cial case, it seems to me.
Professor Correa: Let me give you just one argument in favor of
punishment that, although we could not achieve it, I would still
insist that I want.
Your argument, I think, is very strong when you deal with the
minor cases and the people in the lower ranks. But it's not so
strong when you deal with the people who plan a whole range of
disappearances of the people. They don't derive a lot of compas-
sion from the public as easily as the guy with the gun.
There is a legitimation argument there that I think is quite
important. We still have some guerilla movements on the left
claiming that they're not very important and not very dangerous
to the whole stability of the country. But they can still make the
claim that they're legitimate because we were not able to punish
the people who committed the human rights violations-the crim-
inals. They are going to take up arms in order to retaliate against
what the society was not able to do.
And we have a difficult answer there. They don't gain a lot of
support because of their argument, but they have an argument
there.
Participant: I'm particularly interested in the question of secrecy.
You discussed that in the context of how to help bring about
reconciliation. And from the report, I'm wondering if you would
be willing to comment on how you encourage dealing with secrecy
in the category of preventing future violations.
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It seems that there are a lot of studies that suggest that in
societies in which torture is widely practiced you often find secrecy
occurring because of this extreme desire on the part of some to
control the behavior of others which is always facilitated-this kind
of authoritarian behavior-is facilitated by secrecy. And I see it as
a really important and difficult problem, not only in Chile, but
everywhere in the world in the future of democratic governments.
So, I'm wondering if you would be willing to comment a bit
further about it in this other domain as a prevention in the fu-
ture.
Professor Correa: It's so impressive, I had the chance to talk for
eight hours or more with a woman who was part of the secret
police in the worst years. And it's incredible to see the human
side of the people who were torturing. I mean, they were good
fathers. In the middle of the torture, they called home to see if
the kids were okay. .They are people who in certain environments
just changed radically, and secrecy is one very important factor of
it.
But, really, the big issue there-and, of course, a very broad
answer to your question-is democracy. You need to have some
kind of institution that will focus on those issues and bring them
to light, by media and the judiciary. It's very difficult in a dictator-
ship-the worst kinds of dictatorship-to open up those secrecies.
The whole system works with that.
The first thing you have to do is grant immunity to the secret
police. Even when they were subpoenaed to court, they used their
secret names given to them by the police. It's very difficult to
open them up.
Participant: In many ways the first victim of this terrorism we're
talking about was the president. I'm wondering if there has been
a movement in Chile to rehabilitate his family?
Professor Correa: Yes. The Commission states the case of Allende
and acknowledges that he committed suicide when the govern-
mental palace was being bombed. The report considers him a
victim of political violence, not of human rights violations exactly.
Then, we would have had to claim that the takeover of the gov-
ernment was illegitimate, and half of the Commission believed
that the takeover of the government was legitimate. We solved the
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problem by calling them the victims of political iolence and not
the victims of human rights violations.
His memory is being recovered. There was a symbolic burial.
They brought the remainders from Valparaiso where he was bur-
ied with six people to the place in Santiago. And the President,
with all the government, directed that symbolic funeral with the
widow and others being there.
Participant: When you spoke about the theory of retribution, you
said it was contested. I was wondering how strong it was among
the victims, that they felt these people should suffer? Or did they
feel that maybe the retribution theory is no good anyway and that
they should somehow compensate?
How much do they feel that there has to be an equality of
suffering?
Professor Correa: Right. Very mixed and different feelings. You
would find people that would make impressive statements saying I
have already pardoned and I don't want anybody to be punished
in this case. Of course, they are the rare exception.
They all talked of justice. They wanted these people in the
courts, they wanted them to answer the questions, to be cornered.
It's not just the impunity of somebody who's in jail or who has
liberty. But it's the impunity of somebody who walks in the streets
feeling that he is important.
That's a very important difference. I'm not sure if they want-
ed all of them in jail, but they wanted them cornered and pressed
and suffering. They just wanted them facing the responsibility of
what they have done. Even if they didn't finally go to jail. That's
the common denominator among the relatives.
Participant: One thing we were discussing yesterday was religion
and reconciliation. It hit me that part of the reason for violence is
the idea that suffering and violence are divine creations to right
the wrongs of the world. And even if many people don't believe
that anymore, their attitudes may have been formed by it. And so,
in a way, religion is contradicting itself in emphasizing nonvio-
lence because many people still think that suffering is the appro-
priate and the divinely sanctioned way to restore justice.
I don't know how strong that kind of feeling comes out.
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Professor Correa: I don't know how much that had to do with reli-
gious factors. One could talk about the role the Church
played-and it played the major role in the Chilean situation, no
doubt-in comforting the victims and finding out the truth.
The report of the Commission is a revision of the archives
and the documents of the Catholic Church, being convinced
about them. Also, we have some forms of additional information.
We have some kind of official information that was not destroyed,
the Red Cross reports, for example.
But we mainly focused on the work of the Church. And the
Church, the Catholic Church, has been the great defender of
human rights in the Chilean situation.
Professor Fisher: Just trying to relate to the discussion-doing what
they're doing. I would say you expressed regret that the army offi-
cials had not expressed regret.
Professor Correa: Right.
Professor Fisher: I was thinking about that. I would find that whatev-
er they said, there would be those that said it was not enough.
And the third party might well get a small working group- of army
officers and relatives of the victims together and try to reach a
mediating point. To get a statement that would do the pardoning,
a third party could be just the one to work out the statement to
do that.
So, to get some of that problem met and going forward, a
third party could be helpful. A third party could get kind of a
joint statement. Such as, "We were not the only ones responsible,
but we did make, mistakes, you know. Evil things were done."
That's an area where going forward in dispute resolution
might be relevant. It might be relevant in going forward.
Professor Correa: Right. Well, they made statements. And I think
that some of that has been achieved through the answers of the
armed forces, except for the army. They all acknowledged this was
important, that this may be true. That in order to understand the
excesses that were committed-that was the word they used-one
would have to acknowledge more than the Commission did, i.e.
the whole political situation the country was facing. Those kind of
statements were made by the navy, by the air force, by the police.
Now, the army is stronger. But even the army did not deny any of
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the facts. At least, the government is making strong use of their
statement that this continues to be the uncontested truth.
But some signs of that have been appearing in the area of
the other branches except for the army. I think it's really difficult
to have Pinochet say, "Well, this story is not the story I've been
telling you for seventeen years." But some of that could be worked
out after he retires perhaps.
Professor Mainwaring: Let's have a big hand for Jorge Correa's ex-
cellent presentation.
